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Abstract. The Ring Learning-With-Errors (LWE) problem, whose se-
curity is based on hard ideal lattice problems, has proven to be a promis-
ing primitive with diverse applications in cryptography. There are how-
ever recent discoveries of faster algorithms for the principal ideal SVP
problem, and attempts to generalize the attack to non-principal ideals. In
this work, we study the LWE problem on group rings, and build crypto-
graphic schemes based on this new primitive. One can regard the LWE on
cyclotomic integers as a special case when the underlying group is cyclic,
while our proposal utilizes non-commutative groups, which eliminates
the weakness associated with the principal ideal lattices. In particular,
we show how to build public key encryption schemes from dihedral group
rings, which maintains the efficiency of the ring-LWE and improves its
security.
Keywords: ring-LWE, Non-commutative group ring, Dihedral group
ring
1 Introduction
1.1 The LWE problem
Regev [32] introduced the learning with errors (LWE) problem as a generalization
of the classic learning parity with noise (LPN) problem. To be precise, let q be a
prime, s ∈ Fnq be a fixed private vector, ai ∈ Fnq , 1 ≤ i ≤ m be randomly chosen,
ei ∈ Fq, 1 ≤ i ≤ m be chosen independently accordingly to an error distribution
Fq 7→ R+, which is a discrete Gaussian distribution that centers around 0 with
width qn−0.5−ǫ, and bi = 〈ai, s〉+ ei. Given a list of pairs (ai, bi), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the
LWE problem asks to solve for s, and the LPN problem is the special case when
q = 2.
Informally speaking, it is believed that LWE is hard in the sense that even
though ei tends to be small, when s is hidden, (ai, bi) can not be distinguished
from a random vector in Fn+1q . In fact, Regev [32] proved the hardness for cer-
tain parameters q and error distributions by showing quantum reductions from
approx-SVP and approx-SIVP problems for lattices. Later, Peikert [27] showed a
classical reduction from approx-SVP to the LWE problem under more restrictive
constraints.
Lyubashevsky, Peikert, and Regev [24] introduced an analogous version of
standard LWE over rings, and coined it ring-LWE. Furthermore, they estab-
lished the hardness of ring-LWE by showing the reduction from a certain ideal
lattice problem to the ring-LWE problem. The cryptography systems based on
ring-LWE are much more efficient in terms of key sizes and encryption and de-
cryption complexity. However, the security of systems is based on conjecturally
hard problems on ideal lattices rather than on general lattices.
The LWE problem and ring-LWE problem have proven to be versatile prim-
itives for cryptographic purposes. Besides many other schemes, these applica-
tions include public key encryption schemes proposed by Regev [32], Peikert
and Waters [31], Peikert [27], Lindner and Peikert [22], Stehle´ and Steinfeld [35],
Micciancio and Peikert [25]; identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes proposed
by Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [19], Cash, Hofheinz, Kiltz, and Peik-
ert [8], Agrawal, Boneh, and Boyen [2,1]; fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
schemes proposed by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [6,7], Brakerski, Gentry,
and Vaikuntanathan [5], Fan and Vercauteren [17].
1.2 Our results
The main contribution of the paper is to propose a general framework of generat-
ing LWE instances from group rings. In particular, we demonstrate our approach
by generating LWE instances from dihedral group rings. Recall that given a fi-
nite group G = {g1, . . . , gn} and a commutative ring R, the elements in group
ring R[G] are formal sums
n∑
i=1
rigi, ri ∈ R.
If R = Z, and we provide a Z-module homomorphism from Z[G] to Rn (oth-
erwise known as an embedding), then (one-side) ideals in group rings naturally
correspond to integral lattices. We can generalize LWE to the group ring setting.
In particular, let n be a power of two, D2n be the dihedral group of order 2n,
and r ∈ D2n be an element that generates the cyclic subgroup of order n, then
we should use the ring
Z[D2n]/((r
n/2 + 1)Z[D2n]),
which is also a free Z-module of rank n. Note that (rn/2+1)Z[D2n] is a two-sided
ideal, thus the quotient ring is well defined.
In ring-LWE, there are two types of embeddings of rings of algebraic integers
into Euclidean spaces: canonical embedding and coefficient embedding. If using
canonical embedding, multiplication is component-wise. This is the main reason
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that the original ring-LWE paper preferred canonical embedding. Nevertheless,
the whole ring is embedded as a lattice that is not self-dual, which complicates
the implementation [28]. Note that the canonical embedding of cyclotomic inte-
gers is basically the combined map:
Z[x]/(xn + 1) →֒ C[x]/(xn + 1)→
⊕
0≤k≤n,2∤k
C[x]/(x− e2π
√−1k/(2n)),
where the first map is an inclusion, and the second one is an isomorphism. A
component of the canonical embedding of Z[x]/(xn + 1) corresponds to a group
representation of the cyclic group 〈x〉 of order 2n:
ρk(x
j) = e2π
√−1kj/(2n), 2 ∤ k.
If a group is not commutative, we can use irreducible group representations
to find a canonical embedding of the group ring. However, some irreducible
representations will have dimensions larger than one, thus multiplication in the
group ring is not component-wise under these representations. We should use
coefficient embedding to make implementation simpler.
There are recent discoveries of faster SVP algorithms for principal ideal lat-
tices, and attempts to generalize the idea to non-principal ideal lattices. See
[12,13] and references therein. First observe that the ratio between two genera-
tors of a principal ideal is an integral unit. The main idea of the attacks comes
from the Dirichlet unit theorem: the group of integral units in a number field is
a direct product of a finite group with a free abelian group, whose generators
are known as fundamental units. If taking logarithms of complex norms of their
conjugates, the units are sent to the so-called log-unit lattice, whose SVP is not
hard in many cases. Nevertheless, the ring-LWE cryptosystems are not under
direct threat, since lattice problems in ideal lattices form lower bounds for their
security, and the approximation factors in the attack are too large.
The principal ideals from non-commutative integral group rings do not ap-
pear to suffer from the weakness, since multiplications of units may not com-
mute [33]. A few remarks are in order:
1. The group ring LWE includes LWE on cyclotomic integers as a special case,
thus has security no less than the ring-LWE. Indeed, the ring R = Z[x]/(xn+
1), used in many ring-LWE cryptosystems, is a direct summand of a group
ring from C2n ( the cyclic group of order 2n ):
Z[C2n] = Z[x]/(x
2n − 1) ≡ Z[x]/(xn + 1)⊕ Z[x]/(xn − 1)
One should avoid using the ring Z[x]/(x2n − 1), as the map
Z[x]/(x2n − 1)→ Z[x]/(x − 1)
may leak secret information.
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2. We regard one-dimensional representations over finite fields as security risks
that should be eliminated. Many attacks on the ring-LWE (implicitly) ex-
plores a one-dimensional representation that sends x to a small order element
[9,10,15,16], for example,
Fq[x]/(f(x))→ Fq[x]/(x− 1),
if (x− 1)|f(x) over Fq.
3. Even though rings of algebraic integers in number fields may not be principal
ideal domains (PID), their reductions modulo primes are always principal
ideal rings. The group ring Fp[G], however, is not necessarily a principal
ideal rings if G is non-commutative. We believe that this property provides
an extra protection against attacks.
The proof of security is largely similar to the case of ring-LWE. There is, how-
ever, an important difference: unlike the ring of algebraic integers in a number
field, group rings have ideals that are not invertible. The security of group-ring-
LWE should be based on lattice problems of invertible ideals.
We note that there have been attempts to use non-commutative algebraic
structures, especially the group structures, in designing cryptographical systems
[26]. The approaches that relate closely to ours include using group rings to
replace (Z/qZ)[x]/(xn − 1) in NTRU [37,11,36] and using the learning problem
of non-commutative groups. The former approach has no security proof from
lattice problems. The latter approach is not based on lattice problems.
1.3 Paper organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the mathematical
background. In Section 3 we briefly discuss previous works. In Section 4, we pro-
pose generating LWE instances from non-commutative group rings and establish
public key cryptosystem from dihedral group rings. In Section 5 we analyse the
security of the new approach. Section 6 concludes the paper. We will not try to
optimize the parameters in this paper, leaving it to future work.
2 Mathematical preliminary
In this section, we review the mathematical background on lattices and group
rings.
2.1 Efficiency of cryptographic schemes
To use a cryptography algorithm, one should first establish a security level n.
It is expected that the cryptosystem cannot be broken in 2n bit operations. In
terms of efficiency, the most important parameters for an encryption algorithm
are block size, public/secret key sizes, cipher-text expansion factor and time
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complexity per bit in encryption and decryption. Ideally these parameters should
have sizes that grow slowly with the security level.
Let us first calculate the parameters for the popular public key cryptosystem
RSA, whose security is based on the integer factorization problem. To factor a
number of l bits, the best algorithm – Number Field Sieve – takes heuristic time
at most 2l
1/3+ǫ
. Thus for security level n, the RSA-OAEP system, a practical im-
plementation of RSA, should have key size l = n3−ǫ. To encrypt a block of O(l)
bits, it adds some padding into the message and computes an exponentiation
modulo a number of l bits. Thus it has cipher-text expansion O(1). The public
exponent is small (e.g. e = 65537), but the private exponent has l bits. There-
fore, encryption takes time O˜(l) and decryption takes time O˜(l2), assuming that
we use the fast multiplication algorithm for each modular multiplication. This
results in bit complexity n3−ǫ per ciphertext bit for decryption, and (logn)O(1)
per message bit for encryption if using small encryption exponent. Asymptot-
ically the key size for RSA is not so good. However, the ǫ part has played an
important role in its favor when n is small. To achieve a security level n = 80,
one can use a public modulus of size 1000 bits rather than 803 = 512000 bits,
although a public modulus of 2000-bits is recommended now.
2.2 Lattices and ring-LWE
Given a list of linearly independent column vectors B = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Rn×n,
the (full rank) lattice L(B) is the set
L(B) =
{
n∑
i=1
xibi |xi ∈ Z
}
.
The determinant of the lattice is
det(L) := | det(B)|.
The minimum distance of the lattice is
λ1(L) := min
06=v∈L
||v||
where || · || is the Euclidean norm. The dual lattice is
L∗ := {u ∈ Rn | ∀v ∈ L, 〈u, v〉 ∈ Z}.
Definition 1. Let L ∈ Rn be a full rank lattice. The Shortest Vector Problem
(SVP) is to find a vector v ∈ L such that
||v|| = λ1.
Given a target vector t ∈ Rn, the Closest Vector Problem (CVP) is to find a
vector v ∈ L such that
||v − t|| ≤ ||v′ − t||, ∀v′ ∈ L.
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Definition 2. Let 0 < β < 1/2 be a constant, and L be a lattice. Let y = x+ e
where x ∈ L, and ||e|| < βλ1(L). Given y, the β-BDD problem is to find x.
Definition 3. Let 0 < β < 1/2 be a constant, and L be a lattice. Let y = x+ e
where x ∈ L, and ||e|| < βλ1(L). Given y, the (q, β)-BDD problem is to find any
x′ such that x ≡ x′ (mod qL).
The β-BDD problem can be reduced to (q, β)-BDD problem. In fact, if x −
x′ ∈ qL, then (x − x′)/q ∈ L. The distance between (y − x′)/q and (x − x′)/q
is ||e/q|| . So we have a new BDD problem on the same lattice but with smaller
error. Repeating the procedure will give us a BDD problem that can be solved
by lattice reduction algorithms such as LLL.
2.3 Dihedral groups and group rings
Let G = {g1, g2, . . . , gn} be a finite group of order n. The elements in group ring
R[G] are formal sums
n∑
i=1
rigi, ri ∈ R.
Addition is defined by
n∑
i=1
aigi +
n∑
i=1
bigi =
n∑
i=1
(ai + bi)gi.
Multiplication is defined by
(
n∑
i=1
aigi)(
n∑
i=1
bigi) =
n∑
l=1
(
∑
gigj=gl
aibj)gl. (1)
If R = Z, a (one-side) ideal of Z[G] is mapped to a lattice, under an embed-
ding of Z[G] to Rn. Here we use coefficient embedding, i.e. a group element is sent
to a unit vector in Zn. The whole group ring Z[G] corresponds to Zn. Denote the
length of a group ring element X in the Euclidean norm under the embedding
by ||X ||. The following lemma shows that lengths of group ring elements behave
nicely under multiplication.
Lemma 1. Let X,Y ∈ R[G] be two elements. Then
||XY || ≤ √n||X || · ||Y ||
Proof. From Equation (1), the l∞ norm ofXY is less than |X ||Y | by the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality.
Next, we introduce a new norm of elements in the group ring R(G). For any
element h =
∑n
i=1 aigi ∈ R[G], by the multiplication law (1), it defines a linear
transformation from Rn = R[G] to itself, denoted by A(h). Indeed, it corresponds
the regular representation of the finite group G. Then we define the matrix-norm
|h|Mat of h to be the square root of the norm of the matrix A(h)A(h)T , i.e.,
|h|Mat =
√
Norm(A(h)A(h)T ) =
√
Largest Eigenvalue ofA(h)A(h)T .
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Remark 1. This definition should be the right definition for ring-LWE under any
given embedding. In particular, if the transformation matrix A is diagonal, then
it reduces to the case ℓ∞-norm used in [24] for caninocal embedding.
Let I be a right ideal, the left dual of I is defined as
I−1 = {x ∈ Q[G] | ∀y ∈ I, xy ∈ Z[G]}
It can be verified that the left dual is a left Z[G] module, and
I ⊆ Z[G] ⊆ I−1.
We call an ideal invertible if I−1I = Z[G]. If I is invertible, then I−1 is a left
fractional ideal, namely, there is an integer t such that tI−1 ⊆ Z[G].
A dihedral group of order 2n, denoted by D2n, is the set
{risj | 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ 1}
satisfying the relations
rn = s2 = 1, srs = r−1.
In some sense, the dihedral group is the non-commutative group that is the
closest to the commutative one, since the dimension of any irreducible represen-
tation is bounded by 2, while commutative groups only have one-dimensional
irreducible representations.
If n is odd, there are (n + 1)/2 irreducible representations for D2n. Two of
them are one-dimensional:
ρ0(r
i) = 1, ρ0(sr
j) = 1
and
ρ1(r
i) = 1, ρ1(sr
j) = −1.
The rest are two-dimensional: for 2 ≤ k ≤ (n+ 1)/2,
ρk(r
i) =
(
e2π
√−1i(k−1)/n 0
0 e−2π
√−1i(k−1)/n
)
,
ρk(sr
i) =
(
0 e2π
√−1i(k−1)/n
e−2π
√−1i(k−1)/n 0
)
.
By the Wedderburn theorem, the group ring C[D2n] can be decomposed into
C[D2n] ≡ C⊕ C⊕
(n+1)/2⊕
i=2
C2×2,
where the first two copies of C correspond to ρ0 and ρ1, the last (n−1)/2 copies
of 2 × 2 matrix algebras corresponds to the two-dimensional representations ρi
(2 ≤ k ≤ (n+ 1)/2 ).
To guarantee the hardness results of ring-LWE based on the group ring of
dihedral group, we need to study the matrix-norm of any element in R(D2n).
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Lemma 2. For any element h = f(r) + sg(r) ∈ R[D2n] where
f(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
aix
i and g(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
bix
i
are two polynomials over R. Then the eigenvalues of the matrix A(h) ·A(h)T are
(|f(ξi)| ± |g(ξi)|)2 for i = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1, where ξ = e2π
√−1/n is the n-th root
of unity and | ∗ | is the complex norm. So the matrix-norm of h is bounded from
above by max{|f(ξi)|+ |g(ξi)| | i = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1}.
Proof (Sketch of Proof). By representation theory, we have decomposition of the
regular representation ρreg:
C[D2n]
ρreg−−−−→ C[D2n]
∼=
yψ ∼=yψ
⊕idim(Vi)Vi ρbd−−−−→ ⊕idim(Vi)Vi,
where Vi runs over all irreducible representations of D2n such that ρbd(g) (∀g ∈
D2n) is block-diagonal. One can show the isomorphism ψ is unitary, i.e., ψ ·ψ¯T =
I2n. Then
A(h) · A(h)T = ρreg(h) · ρreg(h)
T
= (ψ−1 · ρbd(h) · ψ) · (ψ−1 · ρbd(h) · ψ)
T
= ψ−1 · ρbd(h) · ψ · ψ¯T · ρbd(h)
T · ψ¯−T = ψ−1 · ρbd(h) · ρbd(h)
T · ψ¯−T .
So A(h) ·A(h)T have the same eigenvalues as ρbd(h) ·ρbd(h)T . Moreover, ρbd(h) ·
ρbd(h)
T
is block-diagonal with blocks of size at most 2×2. By direct computation
of eigenvalues of each block, it is easy to obtain the eigenvalues of ρbd(h)·ρbd(h)
T
are (|f(ξi)|±|g(ξi)|)2 for i = 0, 1, · · · , n−1. And hence eigenvalues of the matrix
A(h) ·A(h)T are (|f(ξi)| ± |g(ξi)|)2 for i = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1.
Lemma 3. For any invertible (right) ideal I of Z[D2n], let I
−1 be the left inverse
of I. Let Λ and Λ−1 be the lattices defined by coefficients embedding of I and I−1
respectively. Then Λ∗ and Λ−1 are the same under a permutation of coordinates.
Proof. For any (x0, x1, · · · , xn−1) ∈ Qn, let
(z0, z1, · · · , zn−1) = (x0, xn−1, xn−2 · · · , x1).
We claim that
(x0, x1, · · · , xn−1, y0, y1, · · · , yn−1) ∈ Λ−1
if and only if
(z0, z1, · · · , zn−1, y0, y1, · · · , yn−1) ∈ Λ∗.
And hence, we finish the proof.
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On one hand, if
∑n−1
i=0 xir
i +
∑n−1
j=0 yjsr
j ∈ I−1, then
(
n−1∑
i=0
xir
i +
n−1∑
j=0
yjsr
j)(
n−1∑
k=0
wkr
k +
n−1∑
l=0
vlsr
l) ∈ Z[D2n]
for any
∑n−1
k=0 wkr
k +
∑n−1
l=0 vlsr
l ∈ I. Expending the product, this is equivalent
to that for any a, b = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1,
n−1∑
i=0
xiwa−i mod n +
n−1∑
j=0
yjva+j mod n ∈ Z,
and
n−1∑
i=0
xivb+i mod n +
n−1∑
j=0
yjwb−j mod n ∈ Z.
So
∑n−1
i=0 xir
i+
∑n−1
j=0 yjsr
j ∈ I−1 if and only if for any∑n−1k=0 wkrk+∑n−1l=0 vlsrl ∈
I and for any a, b = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1,
n−1∑
i=0
ziwa+i mod n +
n−1∑
j=0
yjva+j mod n ∈ Z,
and
n−1∑
i=0
zivb−i mod n +
n−1∑
j=0
yjwb−j mod n ∈ Z.
On the other hand, we have
(z0, z1, · · · , zn−1, y0, y1, · · · , yn−1) ∈ Λ∗
if and only if for any
∑n−1
k=0 wkr
k +
∑n−1
l=0 vlsr
l ∈ I,
n−1∑
i=0
ziwi +
n−1∑
j=0
yjvj ∈ Z.
Note that I is a right ideal of Z[D2n], so for any a, b = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1,
(
n−1∑
k=0
wkr
k +
n−1∑
l=0
vlsr
l)r−a =
n−1∑
k=0
wk+a mod nr
k +
n−1∑
l=0
vl+a mod nsr
l ∈ I
and
(
n−1∑
k=0
wkr
k +
n−1∑
l=0
vlsr
l)srb =
n−1∑
k=0
vb−krk +
n−1∑
l=0
wb−ksrl ∈ I.
So we have
(z0, z1, · · · , zn−1, y0, y1, · · · , yn−1) ∈ Λ∗
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if and only if for any
∑n−1
k=0 wkr
k +
∑n−1
l=0 vlsr
l ∈ I for any a, b = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1,
n−1∑
i=0
ziwa+i mod n +
n−1∑
j=0
yjva+j mod n ∈ Z,
and
n−1∑
i=0
zivb−i mod n +
n−1∑
j=0
yjwb−j mod n ∈ Z.
So the claim is proved.
To eliminate the influence of one-dimensional representations, one can let n
be a prime, and use the direct summand of the ring Z[D2n]:
Z[D2n]/((r
n−1 + rn−2 + · · ·+ 1)Z[D2n]).
Note that (rn−1+ rn−2+ · · ·+1)Z[D2n] is a two-sided ideal, so the above ring is
well defined, and it can be regarded as a projection of Z[D2n] to
⊕(n+1)/2
i=2 C
2×2.
In this paper we assume that n is a power of two, and let
R = Z[D2n]/((r
n/2 + 1)Z[D2n]),
which is also without one-dimensional component. Denote
RR = R⊗Z R
which is Rn under coefficients embedding, and let T = RR/R.
Let q be a prime such that gcd(q, 2n) = 1. Define
Rq = Fq[D2n]/((r
n/2 + 1)Fq[D2n]).
Definition 4. Let χα1,α2,··· ,αn be a Gauss distribution in R
n such that
χα1,α2,··· ,αn(x1, x2, · · · , xn) = e−π((x1/α1)
2+(x2/α2)
2+···+(xn/αn)2)
Let Ψ≤α be the set of all the Gaussian distributions χα1,α2,··· ,αn such that αi ≤ α
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n . The Rq-LWE problem is to find the secret s ∈ Rq, given a
sequence of (ai, bi) ∈ Rq × T, where ai is selected uniformly and independently
from Rq, bi = (ais)/q + ei mod R, ei is selected independently according to
some fixed distribution χ ∈ Ψ≤α.
Remark 2. Not every ideal is invertible. For example, 1 + s ∈ R generates an
ideal that is not invertible. It is very important to have an ideal that is invertible
in order to have hard lattice problems. In the later proof, we need an onto R-
module morphism I → Rq, which requires I to be invertible.
Lemma 4. The element
∑
0≤i≤(n/2)−1 air
i +
∑
0≤i≤(n/2)−1 bisr
i ∈ R is invert-
ible in R⊗Q iff for all odd 1 ≤ k ≤ n/2,
|
∑
0≤i≤(n/2)−1
aie
2π
√−1ki/n| − |
∑
0≤i≤(n/2)−1
bie
2π
√−1ki/n| 6= 0,
where | ∗ | is the complex norm.
Proof. It is easy from Lemma 2.
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3 Previous works
Lattice-based cryptography has attracted much attention recently. It has a few
advantages over classical number theoretic cryptosystems such as RSA or Diffie-
Hellman. First, it resists quantum attacks, in contrast to the traditional hard
problems such as integer factorization, or discrete logarithms [34]. Second, it
enjoys the worst case to the average case reduction, shown in the pioneering
work of Ajtai [3]. Third, computation can be done on small numbers. No large
number exponentiations are needed, which tend to slow down the other public
key cryptosystems. It does have a major drawback in key sizes. The NTRU
cryptosystem [20] is the first successful cryptosystem based on lattices.
3.1 Regev’s scheme
Regev [32] introduced the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem as a general-
ization of the classic learning parity with noise (LPN) problem to higher moduli
and proposed a public key encryption system based on the LWE problem. In the
following description of Regev’s scheme, n is the security parameter, q ∈ [n2, 2n2]
is a prime number and m = O(n log q), α = o( 1√
n logn
).
The distribution Ψα = χα (mod Z) is defined to be a normal distribution on
R/Z with mean 0 and standard deviation α√
2π
. And Ψ¯α is the discrete distribu-
tion of the random variable ⌊q ·X⌉ mod q over Fq, where a mod b = a−⌊a/b⌋b
and X is from the distribution Ψα.
– Private key: Choose a random s ∈ (Z/qZ)n uniformly.
– Public key: Choose a random matrixA ∈ (Z/qZ)n×m uniformly. Choose an
error vector x from (Z/qZ)m, where each component of x is chosen according
to the distribution Ψ¯α. Announce the public key (A,P) where P ∈ (Z/qZ)m
should be calculated as sA+ x.
– Encryption: First select a random vector eT ∈ {0, 1}m. For a message bit
v ∈ {0, 1}, the encryption is (Ae, v⌊ q2⌋+Pe).
– Decryption: For the cipher-text (a, b), output 0 if b − 〈a, s〉 is closer to 0
than to q/2; Otherwise de-crypt to 1.
For security level n, the private key has O˜(n) bits. The public key has O˜(n2)
bits, and can be reduced to O˜(n). The cipher-text expansion is O˜(n). The encod-
ing and decoding complexity is O˜(n2) per bit. Hence this system is not efficient,
especially in terms of cipher-text expansion and encryption/decryption complex-
ity.
To find the private key from the public key, one can solve a CVP problem
in the lattice L = {vA | v ∈ (Z/qZ)n}, which is a sub-lattice of qZm. Note that
qm−n | det(L). The shortest vector of L has length O˜(q√m). This means that
the secret key is likely unique.
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3.2 PVW improvement
Peikert, Vaikuntanathan, and Waters [30] proposed a more efficient system based
on LWE. They made two important changes: first the secret and the error in the
public key are matrices, and the message space consists of vectors; secondly the
alphabet of the message is Z/pZ for some p that may be greater than 2. The latter
idea has also been utilized by Kawachi, Tanaka, and Xagawa [21] to improve the
efficiency of several single-bit cryptosystems based on lattice problems.
Suppose that p = poly(n), l = poly(n), m = O(n logn), α = 1/(p
√
m logn)
and q > p is a prime. Let t be a function from Z/pZ to Z/qZ defined by t(x) =
[x× qp ] and extended to act component-wise on vector spaces over Z/pZ.
– Private key: Choose a random matrix S ∈ (Z/qZ)n×l uniformly.
– Public key: Choose a random matrix A ∈ (Z/qZ)n×m uniformly. Find
an error matrix X ∈ (Z/qZ)l×m where each entry is chosen independently
according to the error distribution χ = Ψ¯α. The public key is (A,P) where
P = STA+X ∈ (Z/qZ)l×m.
– Encryption: The message is assumed to be a vector v ∈ (Z/pZ)l. First
convert it to a vector t(v) in (Z/qZ)l. Then select eT ∈ {0, 1}m uniformly
at random. The encryption is (Ae,Pe+ t(v)) ∈ (Z/qZ)n × (Z/qZ)l.
– Decryption: For the cipher-text (u, c), compute d = c− STu, and output
v ∈ (Z/pZ)l, where vi is the element in Z/pZ that makes di − t(vi) closest
to 0 (mod q).
Note that one may set l = n in the cryptosystem. In this case, the public
key size and secure key size are O˜(n2). The algorithm has cipher-text expansion
O(1). The encryption and decryption complexity is O˜(n) per bit.
The security of the cryptosystem comes from the fact that if S is hidden, the
public key (A,P) is computationally indistinguishable from uniform distribution
over (Z/qZ)n×m×(Z/qZ)l×m, for suitable parameters, under the hypothesis that
LWE is hard.
3.3 PKC based on ideal lattices
To improve the efficiency of the LWE-based system, Lyubashevsky, Peikert, and
Regev [24] proposed the primitive of ring-LWE. Let R = Z[x]/(xn +1), where n
is a power of two. Let Rq = (Z/qZ)[x]/(x
n + 1).
– Private key: The private key is s, e ∈ Rq from an error distribution.
– Public key: Select a random a ∈ Rq uniformly. Output (a, b) ∈ R2q , where
b = as+ e.
– Encryption: To encrypt a bit string z of length n, we view it as an element
in Rq so that bits in z become coefficients of a polynomial. The cipher-text
is (u, v) obtained by
u = ar + e1, v = br + e2 + ⌊q/2⌋z,
where r, e1, e2 are chosen from an error distribution.
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– Decryption: For cipher-text (u, v), computes v − us, which equals
(re − se1 − e2) + ⌊q/2⌋z.
One can read z from v − us, since r, e, e1 and e2 have small coefficients.
The algorithm is very efficient. Public and private key size is O˜(n). Cipher-
text expansion isO(1), and encryption/decryption complexity per bit is (logn)O(1),
assuming that we use the fast multiplication algorithm. The parameters are op-
timal asymptotically, however, the security is based on approx-SVP of ideal
lattices, rather than general lattices.
4 PKC from dihedral group rings
In this section, we describe a cryptosystem based on the dihedral group ring. The
protocol is identical to one based on the ideal lattice, except that since multipli-
cation is not commutative, one needs to pay attention to the order of multiplica-
tion. The discretization χ¯ : Z/qZ→ R of a Gaussian χ on R. First, reduce χ by
modulo Z to obtain a distribution χ mod Z on [0, 1). Then divide [0, 1) into q
parts [1−1/2q, 1)∪ [0, 1/2q), [1/2q, 3/2q), · · · , and [1−3/2q, 1−1/2q), and inte-
grate the distribution (χ mod Z) on each part to define χ¯(0), χ¯(1), · · · , χ¯(q−1).
Let n be a power of two, let q be a prime such that gcd(q, 2n) = 1, and
q ∈ [n2, 2n2]. Recall
R = Z[D2n]/((r
n/2 + 1)Z[D2n]),
RR = R[D2n]/((r
n/2 + 1)R[D2n]),
Rq = Fq[D2n]/((r
n/2 + 1)Fq[D2n]),
and the error distribution χ¯ on Rq is to select coefficients independently accord-
ing to the discretization of a Guassian of width O˜(1/
√
n).
– Private key: The private key is s, e ∈ Rq from the error distribution.
– Public key: Select a random a ∈ Rq uniformly. Output (a, b) ∈ R2q, where
b = sa+ e.
– Encryption: To encrypt a bit string z of length n, we view it as an element
in Rq so that bits in z become coefficients of a polynomial. The cipher-text
is (u, v) obtained by
u = ar + e1, v = br + e2 + ⌊q/2⌋z,
where r, e1, e2 are chosen from an error distribution.
– Decryption: For cipher-text (u, v), one computes v − su, which equals
(re − se1 − e2) + ⌊q/2⌋z.
One can read z from v − us, since r, e, e1 and e2 have small coefficients.
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One can verify that the public and private key sizes are linear in the security
level, and the ciphertext expansion is almost a constant. The following theorem
shows that the encryption/decryption complexity is logarithmic per bit.
Theorem 1. The multiplication in (Z/qZ)[D2n] can be done in O˜(n log q) time.
In this theorem, we use the whole group ring for generality. One can check
that it applies to R as well.
Proof. The main idea is to separate the terms in (Z/qZ)[D2n] into two parts.
Let f1+sf2 and f3+sf4 be two elements where f1, f2, f3 and f4 are polynomials
in r. We have
(f1 + sf2)(f3 + sf4)
=f1f3 + sf2f3 + f1sf4 + sf2sf4
=f1f3 + sf2f3 + s(sf1s)f4 + (sf2s)f4
=(f1f3 + (sf2s)f4) + s(f2f3 + (sf1s)f4)
where sf1s and sf2s are polynomials in r that can be calculated in linear time.
To find the product, we need to compute four polynomial multiplications in
(Z/qZ)[r], that can be done in time O˜(n log q).
In the normal version of group ring LWE, s and e are selected according
to error distribution, while in the regular version, only e is selected according
to error distribution. The following theorem shows that these two versions are
equivalent.
Theorem 2. The regular version of dihedral GR-LWE can be reduced to the
normal version of dihedral GR-LWE.
Proof. (Sketch) Suppose that the input of the LWE problem is (a1, b1) and
(a2, b2). With high probability, a1 is invertible, we construct the input for normal
version of LWE as
(a2a
−1
1 , a2a
−1
1 b1 − b2).
Note that
a2a
−1
1 b1 − b2 = a2a−11 (a1s+ e1)− (a2s+ e2) = a2a−11 e1 − e2.
5 Security analysis of the group ring LWE
In this section, we prove the main theorem
Theorem 3. Let α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1), and let q = q(n) be a prime such that
αq ≥ √nω(√logn). Given an average case of search version of dihedral GR-
LWEq,Ψ≤α oracle with error distributions Ψ≤α, there is a quantum polynomial
time algorithm that solves the search version of the SVP problem for any invert-
ible ideal I of R with approximate factor O˜(n/α).
14
Proof. It is from Lemmas 6 and 8 that with dihedral GR-LWEq,Ψ≤α oracle one
can sample a discrete Gaussian on the ideal I of width λn
√
nω(logn)/α, starting
with a sufficiently large value of width r ≥ 22nλn(I) where any polynomial num-
ber of samples can be generated classically [32]. As a sample from the discrete
Gaussian has Euclidean length at most
√
n·λn(I)
√
nω(logn)/α with overwhelm-
ing probability. So the sample solves the search version of the SVP problem for
the ideal I with approximate factor O˜(n/α).
Let us first review the main ideas in Regev’s reduction from approx-SVP
to LWE, which inspires our proof. The reduction can be divided into iterative
steps. We will solve the Discrete Gaussian Sampling problem (DGS) for a lat-
tice, that has a comparable hardness as approx-SVP. The DGSL,r problem is
to sample lattice points of a lattice L according to a Gaussian centering at O
with width r. For precise definition, see [32]. The DGS will be reduced, by a
quantum algorithm, to a β-BDD problem on its dual lattice L∗, which will then
be reduced to a (q, β)-BDD problem. The (q, β)-BDD will be reduced to a DGS
problem of larger width. This step needs help from the search LWE oracle. After
a few iterations, we arrive at DGS with a width that allows a polynomial time
algorithm.
The only step that needs an LWE oracle is the reduction from (q, β)-BDD
to DGS. Suppose we have a (q, β)-BDD instance y(= x + e), where x ∈ L∗
and ||e|| ≤ λ1(L∗)β. We wish to find x (mod qL∗). We are able to sample a
random element z ∈ L by the DGS algorithm, such that ||z|| ≤ m/λ1(L∗),
where m ≥ q√n. So we have
m/λ1(L∗) ≥ q
√
n/λ1(L∗) ≈ qη(L) = η(qL),
where η(∗) is the smoothing parameter of a lattice. Let a be z mod qL. Then
a is a random element in Fnq by the definition of a smoothing parameter. We
compute a by writing down the coefficients of z in the base B and modulo them
by q. There is a map from Fnq to L (mod qL) given by the base matrix B, such
that ψB = 1, where ψ is a map in the Z-module exact sequence:
0→ qL → L ψ→ Fnq → 0
Note that the map given by B is not a Z-module homomorphism, since the
exact sequence is not splitting. Let b = z(x + e)T = zxT + zeT (mod qZ), and
s = xBT . Note that |zeT |∞ ≤ mβ, and zxT = aBxT = aB(s(B−1)T )T = as.
Call the search LWE oracle, we will get s, which gives us x (mod qL∗), and
completes the reduction. We can see that working with the dual lattice is very
important.
Remark 3. Here the transformation by B is important. We can not just mod z
by qZn, since it may be the case that L ⊆ qZn, or L is not even an integral
lattice.
For LWE on the ring R = Z[x]/(xn + 1), the idea is similar. Any ideal in
the number field Q[x]/(xn + 1) is a Z-module thus corresponds to a lattice if
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we provide an embedding. There are two ways of embedding: canonical and
coefficient. If we use canonical embedding, then the dual is I∨ [24], instead
of I−1. To keep the multiplicative structure of the ring, we need a R-module
isomorphism from I/(qI) to R/(qR) = Fq[x]/(f(x)), and from I
∨/(qI∨) to
R∨/(qR∨) = Fq[x]/(f(x)), so we can recover I∨/(qI∨) from a polynomial in
R/(qR). As pointed out in [24], it is important to clear ideals while preserving
the R-module structure.
Example 1. Let R = Z, q = 5 and I = (3). Suppose that z = 24 ∈ I, z (mod qI)
should be 9 in the parallelepiped [0, 15). Dividing by t = 3, we send z to 3 in
Z/qZ. Hence multiplying by 3 is a Z-module isomorphism from Z/5Z to I/5I.
On the other hand, Z-module isomorphism is not unique. If we can just
use the inclusion I →֒ R, we have z = 4 (mod 5). This is another Z-module
isomorphism. If ψ : I → R is a R-module isomorphism, so is tψ for any t ∈ R.
To complete the reduction, one needs to send an element in Z/5Z back to
I−1/5I−1. Here I−1 = (1/3)Z. One can see that the inclusion Z ⊆ I−1 induces
an isomorphism Z/5Z→ I−1/5I−1.
Now we will extend the idea to non-commutative group ring LWE. We should
use coefficient embedding to map ideals to lattices. In the following discussion,
we will use the same symbol for an ideal and its corresponding lattice under
coefficient embedding.
The precise error distribution in the definition of ring-LWE to ensure the
hardness result is one important issue. In [24], the authors generalized one di-
mensional Gaussian error distribution in plain-LWE [32] to n-dimensional (ellip-
itcal) Gaussian which is described by an n×n-covariance matrix. However, in [24]
they chose the canonical embedding which makes the Gaussian error distribu-
tions during the reduction always diagonal. In our case, the error distributions
in the reduction do not appear as diagonal any more.
Lemma 5. Let L be a lattice, let u ∈ Rn be a vector, let r, s > 0 be two
reals, let A ∈ Rn×n be a non-singular matrix. Assume that smooth property∑
y∈L∗\{0} exp(−πyT ( 1r2 In + 1s2AT · A)−1y) ≤ ǫ holds for some ǫ, where In de-
notes the n×n identity matrix. The distribution of Av+ e where v is distributed
according to DGSL+u,r and e is the n dimensional Gaussian multivariable with
mean vector 0 and diagonal covariance matrix s
2
2π In is within statistical dis-
tance 4ǫ of a Gaussian multivariable with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix
r2
2πA ·AT + s
2
2π In.
Proof (Skecth of Proof). Note that non-singular linear transformation of Gauss-
sian multivariable is still Gaussian, and Av+e = A(v+A−1e). Let Y = v+A−1e.
One can directly compute the distribution of Y
Y (x) =
exp(−πxTΣ−1x)
det(Σ)1/2
∑
y∈L∗ e
−2π√−1<c0,y> exp(−πyT ( 1r2 In + 1s2AT · A)−1y)∑
y∈L∗ e2π
√−1<u,y> exp(−πr2||y||2)
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where Σ = r2In + s
2A−1 ·A−T and c0 is a certain vector computed from u and
x. Since we have
|1−
∑
y∈L∗
e−2π
√−1<c0,y> exp(−πyT ( 1
r2
In +
1
s2
AT ·A)−1y)|
≤
∑
y∈L∗\{0}
exp(−πyT ( 1
r2
In +
1
s2
AT · A)−1y)
≤ǫ
and
|1−
∑
y∈L∗
e2π
√−1<u,y> exp(−πr2||y||2)|
≤|
∑
y∈L∗\{0}
exp(−πr2||y||2)|
≤
∑
y∈L∗\{0}
exp(−πyT ( 1
r2
In +
1
s2
AT · A)−1y)
≤ǫ,
we immediately have
|Y (x) − 1
det(Σ)1/2
exp(−πxTΣ−1x)| ≤ 4ǫ.
So by integrating over Rn, the statistical distance between Y = v + A−1e and
the Gaussian distribution 1
det(Σ)n/2
exp(−πxTΣ−1x) is at most 4ǫ. Finally, since
non-singular linear transformation of Gausssian multivariable is still Gaussian,
Av + e = AY has statistical distance at most 4ǫ with the Gaussian distribution
with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix
1
2π
AΣAT =
1
2π
(r2A ·AT + s2In).
Remark 4. – If the transformation matrix A is diagonal, then it reduces to the
case in [24].
– The proof relies on the invertibility of the matrix A. In the application to
BDD problem, the errors in BDD are invertible with very high probability
except a zero-measure set.
Applying the above lemma to the group ring considered in this paper, to-
gether with Lemma 2, the following corollay is immediate.
Corollary 1. Let L be the ideal lattice obtained by coefficients embedding of
I ⊂ R to Rn. Let h = f(r) + sg(r) ∈ RR for some polynomials of degree
at most n2 − 1 over R, and let λ = |h|Mat. Let r, s > 0 be two reals, denote
t = 1/
√
1
r2 +
λ2
s2 . Assume that smooth property
∑
y∈L∗\{0} exp(−πt2||y||2) ≤ ǫ
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holds for some ǫ. The distribution of hv + e where v is distributed according
to DGSL,r and e is the n dimensional Gaussian multivariable with mean vec-
tor 0 and diagonal covariance matrix s
2
2π In is within statistical distance 4ǫ of a
Gaussian multivariable that is equivalent to the diagonal Gaussian∏
i
χ√
r2(|f(ξi)|+|g(ξi)|)2+s2 ×
∏
i
χ√
r2(|f(ξi)|−|g(ξi)|)2+s2
up to certain unitary base change.
Now we can prove the first part of the iteration algorithm in our scenario.
Lemma 6. [First part of iteration] Let α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1), prime q = q(n) > 2,
let I be a right ideal of R and integer r > 0 such that
∑
y∈I−1\{0}
exp(−π r
2
2q2
||y||2) ≤ ǫ
for some negligible ǫ = ǫ(n). There is a probabilistic polynomial time classical
reduction from BDDI−1,αq/
√
2r in the matrix norm to GR-LWEq,Ψ≤α .
Proof (Skecth of Proof). Suppose y = x + h ∈ h + I−1, where the error h has
matrix-norm≤ q/√2r. We want to recover x. We sample a v ∈ I according to the
Gaussian distribution DGSI,r, and let a = φ1(v) (mod qR) ∈ R/(qR), where
φ1 is the inclusion I → R, which is also a left R-module homomorphism. Note
that qR is a two-sided ideal, R/qR is a direct summand of the ring Fq[D2n].
Since det(I) is not divisible by q, φ1 induces a natural left R-module surjective
homomorphism I → R/(qR). We then calculate b = yv + e (in RR), where e
is a Gaussian χα/
√
2 on RR. We have b ≡ yv = xv + hv + e (mod qR), where
xv ∈ R and the distribution of hv+e has statistic distance within 4ǫ to the Gaus-
sian
∏
i χ
√
(r/q)2(|f(ξi)|+|g(ξi)|)2+(α/√2)2 ×
∏
i χ
√
(r/q)2(|f(ξi)|−|g(ξi)|)2+(α/√2)2 by
Corollary 1. We generate several instances of (a, b), and send them to the GR-
LWEq,Φ≤α oracle. Then the oracle answers s in R/qR, as long as√
(r/q)2|h|2Mat + (α/
√
2)2 ≤ α, or |h|Mat ≤ αq/
√
2r.
Let φ2 be the inclusionR→ I−1, which is also a rightR-module homomorphism.
It induces a natural right module homomorphism I−1 → R/(qR), since q ∤
det(I). So pulling s back along the homomorphism gives us the residue class of
x (mod qI−1).
Lemma 7. If h = f(r)+sg(r) ∈ RR is taken from the Gaussian distribution χσ,
then h has matrix-norm at most σ
√
nω(
√
logn) except with negligible probability.
Proof. Let θ = 2π/n and ξ = eθ
√−1. By Lemma 2, the eigenvaules of A(h)A(h)T
is contained in {(|f(ξi)| ± |g(ξi)|)2 | i 6= 0, n/2} as ξ0 = 1, ξn/2 = −1 appear in
the one dimensional irreducible representations. So
|h|Mat ≤
n/2−1
max
i=1
{|f(ξi)|+ |g(ξi)|}.
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Next, we give an upper bound for |f(ξi)| and |g(ξi)| for any i = 1, 2, · · · , n/2−
1. We can rewrite
|f(ξi)| =
√√√√√

n/2−1∑
j=0
aj cos(jiθ)


2
+

n/2−1∑
j=0
aj sin(jiθ)


2
.
Since a0, a1, · · · , an/2−1 are independently distributed from Gaussian χσ, the
sum
∑n/2−1
j=0 cos(jiθ)aj is Gaussian χ
√∑n/2−1
j=0 cos
2(jiθ)·σ. Because i = 1, 2, · · · , n/2−
1, we have
n/2−1∑
j=0
cos2(jiθ) =
n
2
+
1
2
n/2−1∑
j=0
cos(j2iθ) =
n
2
+
1
2
Re(
n/2−1∑
j=0
ej2iθ
√−1) =
n
2
.
So the sum
∑n/2−1
j=0 cos(jiθ)aj is one dimensional Gaussian χ
√
n/2·σ. It is well-
known that a sample from χ√
n/2·σ has length at most ω(
√
logn)
√
n · σ except
with negligible probability. Similarly, the sum
∑n/2−1
j=0 aj sin(jiθ) is bounded by
ω(
√
logn)
√
n·σ except with negligible probability. And hence, |f(ξi)| is bounded
by ω(
√
logn)
√
n·σ except with negligible probability. By the same reason, |g(ξi)|
is bounded by ω(
√
logn)
√
n · σ except with negligible probability. Then the
lemma is proved.
The second (quantum) part of the iteration algorithm in [32] was improved
by [24] using BDD for error distributed from a Gaussian. By the above lemma,
samples from a Gaussian χd/
√
2n are distributed in the ball Bdω(
√
logn) under
the matrix norm except with a negligible probability. So it is enough to have a
BDD oracle which can solve errors of matrix-norm ≤ dω(√logn).
Lemma 8. [Second part of iteration] There is an efficient quantum algorithm
that, given any n-dimensional lattice Λ, a number d < λ1(Λ
∗)/2 (here, λ1 is
under Euclidean norm), and an oracle that solves BDDΛ∗,dω(
√
logn) in matrix-
norm, outputs a sample from DGSΛ,
√
n/d.
6 Conclusion
We propose generating LWE instances from non-commutative group rings and il-
lustrate the approach by presenting a public key scheme based on dihedral group
rings. We believe that LWE on dihedral group rings achieves the right trade-off
between security and efficiency. As with the original LWE and ring-LWE, we
hope that the new approach is a versatile primitive, so we can build various
cryptographic schemes based on this primitive besides public-key encryption.
There is one open problem that we find very interesting: Can we generalize the
approach to other non-commutative groups and keep the efficiency of ring-LWE?
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